China has significantly ramped up its presence in Bhutan, constructing at least 22 villages within Bhutanese territory over the past eight years. Eight of these settlements have been built in the western sector near the strategically critical Doklam plateau since 2020, as shown by recent satellite imagery. These villages are located in valleys or on ridges that overlook areas claimed by China, with some in close proximity to Chinese military outposts.
The largest of these settlements, Jiwu, was constructed on the Tshethangkha pasture, traditionally used by Bhutanese people, and is situated in the western sector. Experts have raised concerns about the construction’s implications for India’s security, particularly regarding the vulnerability of the Siliguri Corridor, a narrow land link connecting India’s mainland to the northeastern states. Doklam itself was the site of a tense 73-day military standoff between India and China in 2017, triggered by China’s attempt to build infrastructure that would grant it access to the southern part of the plateau.
Despite repeated satellite images indicating the ongoing construction in the region, Bhutan has denied the presence of Chinese settlements, with former Bhutanese Prime Minister Lotay Tshering notably claiming in 2023 that these facilities were not within Bhutan’s territory. However, a recent report by Robert Barnett from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) suggests that China has annexed about 825 square kilometers of Bhutanese land since 2016, which constitutes roughly 2% of Bhutan’s total territory. The report estimates that China has relocated nearly 7,000 people into the newly established villages, which are interconnected by roads leading back to Chinese towns.
Seven of these settlements were constructed in early 2023, marking a noticeable acceleration in China’s efforts to establish control in Bhutan’s western region. Notably, three of these villages are slated to be upgraded to towns. The settlements are part of China’s broader objective to secure the Doklam plateau and adjacent areas, forming a 36-kilometer line of villages with an average distance of about 5.3 kilometers between them. These areas are considered traditionally Bhutanese, with some historians stating that they were ceded to Bhutan by Tibet’s then ruler in 1913.
Experts like Ashok Kantha, former Indian Ambassador to Beijing, have criticized China’s actions as a violation of the 1998 China-Bhutan agreement, which commits both nations to maintaining peace and tranquility along their borders and refrains from unilateral actions that alter the status quo. According to Kantha, China’s systematic creation of these villages represents an effort to change facts on the ground, similar to its tactics in the South China Sea. The Bhutanese government, while unable to challenge these developments directly due to the power asymmetry, is caught in a difficult position, as China continues to assert its claims in Bhutanese territory.
For India, the Doklam region remains crucial due to its strategic location near the Siliguri Corridor. While Bhutan maintains that the issue will be addressed trilaterally between China, Bhutan, and India, experts like Barnett believe that China’s continued pressure on Bhutan may eventually lead to an increased Chinese influence in the region. He predicts that Bhutan may eventually have to allow China to open an embassy in Thimphu, leading to greater economic engagement between the two countries.
The geopolitical dynamics between China, India, and Bhutan have been further complicated by the ongoing tensions between India and China, which saw a dramatic escalation in 2020 with the military standoff in the Ladakh sector. While recent talks between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping have led to disengagement on some border issues, the situation remains sensitive, particularly in the region surrounding Doklam.
As China continues to expand its influence, the question remains whether Bhutan will maintain its longstanding security ties with India or increasingly gravitate towards China, driven by economic incentives and diplomatic pressure.
